

THIRD DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP NO. 133827, November 28, 2014]

ENERSA L. BERNARDINO AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER, PETITIONER, VS. PURCEL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

DE GUIA-SALVADOR, R., J.:

At bench is a Petition for Review of the Decision dated August 28, 2012^[1] rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 10-954, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, of Antipolo, Rizal, dated November 23, 2009 is hereby AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED.^[2]

The Facts

Respondent Purcel Development Corporation ("respondent" / "Purcel") represents itself as the holder of leasehold rights over the so-called Masinag Market, a commercial building and wet and dry market located at Marcos Highway corner Sumulong Highway, Barrio Mayamot, Antipolo City.^[3]

Petitioner Enersa L. Bernardino ("petitioner" / "Bernardino") was one of the respondent's sub-lessees.^[4]

On January 6, 2009, respondent filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against petitioner, alleging: that after the Contract of Sublease lasting from December 15, 2000 to December 14, 2005 had expired, petitioner refused and failed to sign and execute the new Contract of Sublease despite respondent's demands;^[5] that the new contract of sublease is identical to the expired contract of sublease;^[6] that despite the expiration of the earlier contract of sublease, petitioner continued with its occupation of Space/Market Stall Nos. R-1 and R-2 at the Masinag Market;^[7] that the occupation became an implied new lease on a day-to-day basis as provided for under Article 1687 of the Civil Code;^[8] and that final demand was made by respondent for petitioner to sign the new contract of sublease but such went unheeded.^[9]

Additionally, respondent alleges that under the expired and the new contract of sublease, it was petitioner who was liable to pay the value added tax (VAT);^[10] that respondent made "numerous" written and verbal demands for petitioner to pay the VAT, but the latter only paid the daily rent of Php780, which did not include the VAT of Php93.60 per day;^[11] that final demand to pay the VAT was made;^[12] that, also, the day-to-day lease was terminated due to petitioner's refusal to sign the new contract of sublease;^[13] that final demand to vacate the premises and pay the VAT was also made;^[14] and that despite receipt of such final demand, petitioner failed to vacate the leased premises and pay the unpaid VAT.^[15]

In her Answer, petitioner denies the material averments of the complaint, specifically her refusal to sign the lease contract and non-payment of VAT, but admits that she was a lessee of Space/Market Stall Nos. R-1 and R-2 through the now expired Contract of Sublease;^[16] that the actual coverage period of the lease was December 15, 1999 to midnight of December 14, 2004;^[17] that she did not make an oath to a lawyer (notary) on November 20, 2000 as the parties signed the contract on December 10, 1999;^[18] that she admits being in possession of the leased premises;^[19] that it was not she, but the respondent who "deliberately refused and failed to sign and formalize" the new contract of sublease;^[20] that she was merely made to sign a set of blank documents which purportedly were copies of the new lease contract;^[21] that she "continuously and religiously" remitted rental payments which respondent "accepted without any other imposition or additional charges;"^[22] that respondent began to harass and threaten petitioner and other tenants after the latter organized themselves into a "Samahan ng mga Vendors at Tenants sa Masinag, Inc.," ("Samahan");^[23] that on February 28, 2007, respondent wrote the petitioner and other tenants a letter "imposing additional amounts for payment (12% VAT and 5% withholding tax);"^[24] that other hostile and threatening letters followed;^[25] that it is respondent, and not petitioner, who is liable for VAT and the withholding tax;^[26] that the provisions on VAT and withholding tax on the sublease do not apply from the year 2005 onwards, as no written contract was executed by the parties for that period;^[27] that the holdover provision of the expired lease likewise does not apply because petitioner's stay in the premises is against the will and without the consent of respondent, as admitted by the latter;^[28] that respondent's continuous acceptance of petitioner's rental payments, even the latest ones, amounts to estoppel *in pais*;^[29] and that petitioner is entitled to the court's fixing of an extension of the lease period under Article 1687 of the Civil Code.^[30]

With the conclusion of the preliminary conference, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers and documentary evidence.^[31]

The MTCC's Decision

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), in its Decision dated November 23, 2009,^[32] ruled in favor of Purcel, herein respondent. The court found that the new Contract of Sublease as alleged by petitioner does not exist.^[33] It also held that the allegation of petitioner that she signed such contract but the details were left

unfilled also holds no water.^[34] And since petitioner admits that she holds the premises without respondent's consent, then the holdover provisions of the second half of paragraph 20 of the expired sublease contract apply.^[35] According to the MTCC, the provision entitles the respondent to collect the latest monthly rent plus a 50% surcharge until petitioner vacates.^[36] Lastly, the MTCC concluded that respondent had the right to demand for petitioner to vacate and to collect unpaid VAT dues.^[37]

The dispositive portion of the MTCC decision stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Purcel Development Corporation and against defendant Enersa L. Bernardino and all persons claiming rights under her, and she is hereby ordered the following, to wit:

1. to vacate the leased premises known as Space/Market Stall Nos. R-1 and R-2 in Masinag Market, Antipolo City;
2. to pay plaintiff the following amounts:
 - a) by way of actual damages, the amount of P93.60 per day for unpaid VAT, including interest charges at the rate of 3% monthly computed from December 2004 until defendant and all persons claiming rights under her finally vacate the leased premises;
 - b) by way of just compensation on defendant's continuous use of the leased premises against the will of plaintiff, the amount of P1,170.00 per day from October 2, 2008 until defendant and all persons claiming rights under her finally vacate the leased premises;
 - c) by way of penalty charges, the amount of P46,800.00 equivalent to 2 months rental based on the latest monthly rate;
 - d) the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
 - e) the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.^[38]

Petitioner appealed the above decision of the MTCC to the RTC.^[39]

The RTC's Ruling

On August 28, 2012, the RTC issued the Decision subject of this petition. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and concurred with all of its findings. The RTC held that the petitioner failed to pay the VAT and failed to renew the lease contract on the subject premises.^[40] It agreed with the lower court that payment of rent alone does not subvert the right of the lessor to recover possession of the leased premises from the lessee.^[41] Further, the National Internal Revenue Code states that VAT may be shifted or passed on to the lessee.^[42]

Hence, the instant petition for review.

The Issues

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the appealed decision on the following errors ascribed to the RTC:

- I. x x x IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION BY AFFIRMING THE EJECTMENT OF THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF A NON-EXISTENT WRITTEN CONTRACT WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.
- II. x x x IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY ACTUAL DAMAGES, THE AMOUNT OF P93.60 PER DAY FOR UNPAID VAT INCLUDING INTEREST CHARGES AT THE RATE OF 3% PER MONTH COMPUTED FROM DECEMBER 2004, UNTIL DEFENDANTS AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER FINALLY VACATE THE LEASED PREMISES IN THE ABSENCE OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT OF LEASE.
- III. x x x IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY BY WAY OF JUST COMPENSATION ON PETITIONER'S CONTINUOUS USE OF THE LEASED PREMISES AGAINST THE WILL OF RESPONDENT, FROM OCTOBER 2, 2008, UNTIL DEFENDANT AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER FINALLY VACATE THE LEASED PREMISES.
- IV. x x x IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY BY WAY OF PENALTY CHARGES, THE AMOUNT OF P46,800.00 EQUIVALENT TO TWO MONTHS RENTAL BASED ON THE LATEST MONTHLY RATE.
- V. x x x IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P30,000.00.
- VI. x x x IN NOT FIXING THE TERM OF THE OCCUPANCY OF PETITIONER ON THE SUBJECT STALLS (R-1 & R-2).^[43]

The Court's Ruling

The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

On the alleged lack of cause of action to eject petitioner, and

On the non-fixing of the term of the implied new lease

Petitioner alleges that refusal or failure to sign a new contract of sub-lease is not a ground to eject a lessee.^[44] She insists that the fact that she was allowed to occupy and the rentals were accepted by the lessor means that an implied contract was created.^[45] She alleges that it was she and the other tenants who verbally and in writing demanded for their copy of the contract of lease from respondent, but the

latter did not heed their demands.^[46] Likewise, petitioner argues that non-payment of VAT is also not a ground for ejectment, as VAT belongs to the government, and not to respondent.^[47]

We are unswayed by petitioner's contentions.

Respondent as lessor terminated the lease with petitioner in a letter dated September 29, 2008, which the latter received on October 3, 2008.^[48] Hence, as of the latter date, petitioner's right to possess the leased premises had terminated, and her continued possession of the same had become unlawful.

Depending on which party is alleging, both lessor and lessee used to have a formal written Contract of Sublease covering the periods December 15, 2000 to December 14, 2005^[49] or December 15, 1999 to midnight of December 14, 2004.^[50] Hence, past December 14, 2005, at the latest, petitioner's occupation as lessee, with the tolerance of respondent as lessor, was without the benefit of a formal written contract executed in a public instrument and was only by virtue of an implied new lease. It is a case of *tacita reconduccion*, which signifies a lease that has expired but with the lessee continuing to enjoy the thing leased with the acquiescence of the lessor; absent notice from either party of a contrary intention, an implied new lease arises whose duration is based on the periods stated in Article 1687 of the Civil Code,^[51] which states:

Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and **from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily**. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, a lease with no fixed period, but wherein rentals are paid daily, is deemed to be from day to day; it is, however, a lease with a **definite period** and, like month-to-month leases which expire after the last day of any given thirty-day period,^[52] a day-to-day lease expires after the end of each day, **upon proper notice of termination by the lessor**. At the end of this definite period, the lessee who has been notified of the termination but continues to remain in possession already does so unlawfully, and may be evicted.^[53]

Such is the situation in the case before Us. After October 3, 2008, the day petitioner received respondent's letter of termination, the lease had expired and the occupant lessee may already be ejected. Although respondent, the lessor, cited the "failure and/or refusal" by petitioner to execute a new contract as well as the latter's refusal to pay the VAT as reasons for the termination, in reality, in implied lease contracts such as the above, respondent did not even have to do so, as it had the right to