

## SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 112569, April 12, 2000 ]

**SHUHEI YASUDA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND  
BLUE CROSS INSURANCE, INC., RESPONDENTS.**

### D E C I S I O N

**QUISUMBING, J.:**

This is a special civil action for certiorari<sup>[1]</sup> under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking reversal of the decision<sup>[2]</sup> of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31402 on November 11, 1993 and setting aside the writs of execution pending appeal issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

**WHEREFORE,** the petition is **GRANTED**. The Order dated February 16, 1993 and the writ of execution pending appeal issued pursuant thereto are hereby SET ASIDE **insofar as herein petitioner is concerned** [Blue Cross], and the Order dated June 17, 1993 and the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto are **ANNULLED and SET ASIDE**. The ensuing writs and processes in the implementation of said Order of June 17, 1993 are equally ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent [Shuhei Yasuda] and/or respondent Sheriff are/is hereby ordered to return to petitioner [Blue Cross] the seized properties of the petitioner.

SO ORDERED<sup>[3]</sup>

By this decision, the Court of Appeals rendered nugatory, as far as private respondent is concerned, the Order dated February 16, 1993, issued by the trial court granting execution pending appeal.<sup>[4]</sup>

Further, respondent appellate court also set aside the Order of the trial court dated June 17, 1993, granting petitioner's Application for Judgment against the counterbond filed by private respondent Blue Cross Insurance, Inc.

The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:

Petitioner Shuhei Yasuda is a Japanese national.<sup>[5]</sup> Enrique Rojas, Eduardo Lopingco, and he, incorporated the YRL Shipping Co. S/A, a foreign corporation organized in Panama and engaged in the shipping business.<sup>[6]</sup>

On January 9, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, to collect from defendants YRL Shipping Co. S.A., Azucar Shipping Corp., Eduardo Lopingco, Enrique Rojas, and Arnold Savella the sum of P8,966,304.00. It also asked for damages, issuance of an arrest order, preliminary attachment,

restraining order and injunction.<sup>[7]</sup> The amount represents the alleged equity interest and share of petitioner in the income of YRL Shipping Co. derived from its operations here in the Philippines under a Bareboat Charter Agreement with the Azucar Shipping Corp. Such amount was allegedly withheld by the defendants from petitioner.

In an order dated January 16, 1990, the RTC granted petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.<sup>[8]</sup>

On January 30, 1990, defendant Eduardo Lopingco filed a motion to quash the order, but the RTC denied it in an order dated February 6, 1990.<sup>[9]</sup>

On February 6, 1990, the trial court granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. It also enjoined said private respondents and any and all persons or agents or parties acting in their behalf from managing or otherwise operating the vessel M/V Valiant beyond March 31, 1990, upon posting of a bond in the amount of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00).<sup>[10]</sup>

On February 14, 1990, the defendants except Savella filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the two (2) orders dated February 6, 1990, which was denied in an order dated March 8, 1990.<sup>[11]</sup>

Defendants assailed the orders of the RTC granting the attachment and injunction through a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 22017 with the Court of Appeals. It was dismissed on February 28, 1991.<sup>[12]</sup> Defendants' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.<sup>[13]</sup>

Defendants appealed to this Court, but we sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated October 7, 1991.<sup>[14]</sup>

To discharge and release the properties subject of the writs of attachment and injunction, private respondents filed with the trial court counterbonds issued by private respondent Blue Cross Insurance, Inc.,<sup>[15]</sup> in the amounts of P8,966,304.00 and P1,000,000.00.<sup>[16]</sup>

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision<sup>[17]</sup> in favor of the petitioner-plaintiff. In addition, it ordered the defendants to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

The RTC dismissed defendants' counterclaims and cross-claims for lack of merit.<sup>[18]</sup>

Defendants, except Savella, appealed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.<sup>[19]</sup>

On February 16, 1993 upon petitioner's motion and over the vigorous opposition of defendants except Savella, the trial court issued an order allowing execution pending appeal of a portion of its decision awarding actual or compensatory damages. The trial court found that there are good reasons to justify the execution of the judgment pending appeal, namely, that the appeal taken by the defendants is dilatory; that herein petitioner is a Japanese national and is sickly; that the vessel

M/V "Valiant" has been left to waste and deteriorating at the pier, and is in grave danger of losing its value; and that petitioner posted bond to answer for any damages which the defendants may suffer if the court later finds that petitioner is not entitled thereto.<sup>[20]</sup> Accordingly, the trial court issued a writ of execution.<sup>[21]</sup>

As attested to in the Sheriffs Report dated April 27, 1993, the Sheriff was able to execute only No. II, par. a, but failed to execute the money judgment under pars. b, c, d and e of the order dated February 16, 1993, by the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, because defendants with whom private respondent Blue Cross acted as surety, cannot be located and their properties could not be determined.<sup>[22]</sup>

On May 5, 1993, petitioner then filed an application for judgment against the counterbonds issued by private respondent<sup>[23]</sup> which, after hearing, was granted by the trial court in its order dated June 17, 1993.<sup>[24]</sup>

Private respondent Blue Cross filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction <sup>[25]</sup> with the Court of Appeals, questioning the propriety of the order of execution pending appeal and the subsequent writ of execution. At the same time, the trial court issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties. However, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the trial court and the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution against the counterbonds issued by private respondent, and from conducting the auction sale.<sup>[26]</sup>

The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari filed by private respondent Blue Cross. It set aside the writs of execution pending appeal issued by the trial court, insofar as private respondent is concerned.<sup>[27]</sup>

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari,<sup>[28]</sup> filed by the aggrieved private party, Shuheí Yasuda.

Petitioner herein imputes to the Court of Appeals errors of law as well as grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:

1. . . . IN ANNULING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER OF FEBRUARY 16, 1993 ALLOWING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, BECAUSE THE PETITIONER BLUE CROSS, QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY THEREOF, IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE, AND THE SAID ORDER HAS ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AFTER THE DEFENDANTS (PRINCIPALS OF BLUE CROSS) BOWED TO THE SAME AND DID NOT ELEVATE THE SAID. ORDER TO THE COURT OF APPEALS;

2. . . . IN ALLOWING PRIVATE RESPONDENT, WHICH IS BUT A SURETY, TO RAISE SEPARATE DEFENSES AGAINST THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL BECAUSE IT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED A SURETY TO BECOME A PARTY AND TO LITIGATE WITH: PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF; [and]

3. . . . IN ANNULING THE ORDER OF JUNE 17, 1993 AND THE WRIT ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH BECAUSE THE PRIVATE.

RESPONDENT BLUE CROSS AND DEFENDANTS ARE TREATED IN. LAW AS ONE AND THE SAME AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT BLUE CROSS IS BOUND BY THE ORDER OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ISSUED AGAINST ITS PRINCIPALS, THE DEFENDANTS.<sup>[29]</sup>

In brief, the pertinent issues to be resolved are:

- 1 Whether or not the surety has standing to question the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal?
- 2 Whether or not there were good reasons to allow execution pending appeal?

At the outset, it must be noted that the surety in this case filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. It questioned the propriety of the order of execution pending appeal and the subsequent writ of execution issued pursuant thereto. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action, independent from the principal action, and not a part or continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.<sup>[30]</sup> It does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary periods involved in the proceedings, unless an application for a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to the appellate court is granted,<sup>[31]</sup> as in the present case. It is not a mode of appeal where the appellate court reviews the errors of fact or law committed by the lower court. The issue in a special civil action for certiorari is whether the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.<sup>[32]</sup>

In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner and respondent are also the original parties to the action in the lower court. But in certiorari as an original action, the parties are the aggrieved party against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency and the prevailing parties, who thereby respectively become the petitioner and respondents.<sup>[33]</sup> Paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a **person aggrieved** thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

[Emphasis supplied.] <sup>[34]</sup>

Private respondent herein, Blue Cross, had personality to bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. As the entity that that posted the bonds, and aggrieved by the trial court's order of execution pending appeal, Blue Cross had