

## EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 168703, February 26, 2013 ]

**RAMON G. NAZARENO, PETITIONER, VS. MAERSK FILIPINAS  
CREWING INC., AND ELITE SHIPPING A/S, RESPONDENTS.**

### D E C I S I O N

**PERALTA, J.:**

This is a petition for review on *certiorari* assailing the Decision<sup>[1]</sup> dated April 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84811, and the Resolution<sup>[2]</sup> dated June 28, 2005 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

On February 16, 2001, petitioner Ramon G. Nazareno was hired by Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. (MCI) as Chief Officer for and in behalf of its foreign principal Elite Shipping A/S (Elite) on board its vessel M/V Artkis Hope for a period of six (6) months with a basic salary of US\$1,129.00.

On March 25, 2001, the vessel was berthed at Port Belem, Brazil to load timber. While petitioner was checking the last bundle of timber to be loaded, he suddenly lost his balance and fell at a height of two (2) meters. He landed on the timber and injured his right shoulder. Due to the pain he felt in his right shoulder, he was later examined at Philadelphia, U.S.A. and was considered not fit for work. It was recommended that petitioner should be confined for thorough evaluation and further tests, such as MRI. Petitioner was also advised to see an Orthopedic Surgeon and/or a Neurologist.<sup>[3]</sup> However, petitioner was not permitted to disembark as there was no one available to replace him.

On August 8, 2001, at Ulsan, South Korea, petitioner was brought at the Ulsan Hyundai Hospital where he was treated and given medication for his "frozen right shoulder."<sup>[4]</sup> He was also advised to undergo physical therapy. Consequently, petitioner was declared unfit to work and was recommended to be signed off from duty.

On August 10, 2001, petitioner was repatriated to Manila. He then reported to MCI which referred him to the Medical Center Manila (MCM) where he underwent a physical therapy program under Dr. Antonio O. Periquet (Dr. Periquet) three times a week. On October 31, 2001, Dr. Emmanuel C. Campana (Dr. Campana) issued a Medical Certificate<sup>[5]</sup> stating that petitioner has been under their medical care since August 13, 2001 and that after treatment and physical therapy, petitioner was fit for work as of October 21, 2001.

However, after almost two (2) months of therapy, petitioner did not notice any

improvement. He informed Dr. Periquet that when he was in Philadelphia, U.S.A., he was advised to consult a neurologist and undergo MRI. When Dr. Periquet ignored him, he consulted another doctor. Thus, from October 23, 2001 to December 1, 2001, petitioner underwent a series of treatment for his "frozen shoulder of the right arm" from Dr. Johnny G. Tan, Jr. (Dr. Tan) in his Chiropractic Clinic.<sup>[6]</sup>

On December 27, 2001, petitioner consulted Dr. Cymbeline B. Perez-Santiago (Dr. Santiago), a Neurologist at the Makati Medical Center, and was subjected to neurologic examinations. In her Neurologic Summary<sup>[7]</sup> dated February 28, 2002, Dr. Santiago concluded that petitioner will no longer be able to function as in his previous disease-free state and that his condition would hamper him from operating as chief officer of a ship.

Meanwhile, petitioner was also examined by Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo who, in a Medical Certificate<sup>[8]</sup> dated January 29, 2002, diagnosed petitioner to be suffering from Parkinson's disease and a frozen right shoulder (secondary), with an "Impediment Grade VII (41.8%). He concluded that petitioner is unfit to work as a seafarer.

On the basis of the findings of his doctors, petitioner sought payment of his disability benefits and medical allowance from respondents, but was refused. Petitioner therefore instituted the present Complaint<sup>[9]</sup> against the respondents docketed as NLRC OFW Case No. (M) 02-03-0660-00.

On February 24, 2003, after the parties submitted their respective pleadings, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision<sup>[10]</sup> in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to pay the former his disability claims, sickness allowance, and attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of which reads:

**WHEREFORE**, premises considered, judgement (sic) is hereby rendered ordering the respondents Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc./Elite Shipping A/S to jointly and severally pay complainant Ramon D. (sic) Nazareno the amount of **TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN US DOLLARS & 60/100 (US\$27,957.60)**, or its equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing his disability claims, sickness allowance and attorney's fees.

All other claims are **DISMISSED** for lack of merit.

**SO ORDERED.**<sup>[11]</sup>

The LA gave credence to the findings and assessments of petitioner's attending physicians who took care and treated him, instead of the conclusion of Dr. Campana that petitioner was already fit for work as of October 21, 2001. The LA held that the medical certificate of Dr. Campana cannot prevail over the findings of the physicians who treated petitioner.

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On April 15, 2004, the NLRC, Third Division, rendered a Decision<sup>[12]</sup>

affirming with modification the decision of the LA. The tribunal concurred with the findings of the LA that petitioner was entitled to disability benefits. It, however, deleted the grant of sickness allowance, considering that petitioner had already received the same. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of February 24, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the award of US\$4,516.00 for sick wages, the other awards are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.<sup>[13]</sup>

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,<sup>[14]</sup> but it was denied in the Resolution<sup>[15]</sup> dated May 31, 2004.

Respondents then sought recourse before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in ruling in favor of the petitioner,<sup>[16]</sup> which case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84811.

On April 27, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision<sup>[17]</sup> granting the petition. The CA set aside the decision and resolution of the NLRC and dismissed petitioner's complaint, the decretal portion of which reads:

**WHEREFORE**, premises considered, we hereby **GRANT** the petition and accordingly: **SET ASIDE** the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission for being null and void; and **DISMISS** the private respondent's COMPLAINT for lack of merit.

**SO ORDERED.**<sup>[18]</sup>

In ruling in favor of the respondents, the CA opined that petitioner is covered by the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and under Section 20 of the said POEA-SEC, the disability of a seafarer can only be assessed by the company-designated physician and not by the seafarer's own doctor.

Hence, the petition assigning the lone error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISIONS OF BOTH THE LABOR ARBITER A *QUO* AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FINDING PETITIONER ALREADY UNFIT TO WORK AS A RESULT OF THE INJURY HE SUSTAINED DURING THE ACCIDENT ON BOARD THE RESPONDENT'S VESSEL AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS.<sup>[19]</sup>

Petitioner argues that there is enough reason to disregard the assessment of Dr. Campana, the respondents' company-designated physician, that he is already fit for work as of October 21, 2001. Petitioner maintains that despite the said findings, he

still found it difficult to walk and move his upper right extremities. Petitioner, thus, sought further treatment from other doctors. The fact that he continued to undergo further examinations and treatments belie the declaration that he was fit for work. Petitioner claims that both the LA and the NLRC cannot be faulted for disregarding the findings of respondents' company-designated physician and in upholding instead the assessment of his independent doctors.

Moreover, petitioner contends that the records of the case would clearly reveal that the present complaint was filed on the basis of his injured right shoulder that he suffered while working on board respondents' vessel and not solely on the basis of his Parkinson's disease, which was diagnosed only at a later time.

Finally, petitioner insists that he is entitled to the payment of attorney's fees.

On their part, respondents argue that the CA acted in accordance with the law when it set aside and annulled the decision of the NLRC and dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of merit.

The petition is meritorious.

In the case at bar, the CA relied on the provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC<sup>[20]</sup> and the ruling of this Court in *German Marine Agencies, Inc. v NLRC*,<sup>[21]</sup> in concluding that the disability of a seafarer can only be determined by a company-designated physician and not the seafarer's own doctors.

Respecting the findings of the CA that it is the 1996 POEA-SEC which is applicable, nonetheless the case of *Abante v. KJGS Fleet Management Manila*<sup>[22]</sup> is instructive and worthy of note. In the said case, the CA similarly held that the contract of the parties therein was also governed by Memo Circular No. 55, series of 1996.<sup>[23]</sup> Thus, the CA ruled that it is the assessment of the company-designated physician which is deemed controlling in the determination of a seafarer's entitlement to disability benefits and not the opinion of another doctor. Nevertheless, that conclusion of the CA was reversed by this Court. Instead, the Court upheld the findings of the independent physician as to the claimant's disability. The Court pronounced:

Respecting the appellate court's ruling that it is POEA Memo Circular No. 55, series of 1996 which is applicable and not Memo Circular No. 9, series of 2000, *apropos* is the ruling in *Seagull Maritime Corporation v. Dee* involving employment contract entered into in 1999, before the promulgation of POEA Memo Circular No. 9, series of 2000 or the use of the new POEA Standard Employment Contract, like that involved in the present case. In said case, the Court applied the 2000 Circular in holding that while it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffered permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to seek a second opinion which can then be used by the labor tribunals in awarding disability claims.<sup>[24]</sup>

Verily, in the cited case of *Seagull Maritime Corporation v. Dee*,<sup>[25]</sup> this Court held

that nowhere in the case of *German Marine Agencies, Inc. v NLRC*<sup>[26]</sup> was it held that the company-designated physician's assessment of the nature and extent of a seaman's disability is final and conclusive on the employer company and the seafarer-claimant. While it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffered a permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to seek a second opinion.<sup>[27]</sup>

The case of *Maunlad Transport, Inc. v. Manigo, Jr.*<sup>[28]</sup> is also worthy of note. In the said case, the Court reiterated the prerogative of a seafarer to request for a second opinion with the qualification that the physician's report shall still be evaluated according to its inherent merit for the Court's consideration, to wit:

All told, the rule is that under Section 20-B (3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits. However, in submitting himself to examination by the company-designated physician, a claimant does not automatically bind himself to the medical report issued by the company-designated physician; neither are the labor tribunals and the courts bound by said medical report. Its inherent merit will be weighed and duly considered. Moreover, the claimant may dispute the medical report issued by the company-designated physician by seasonably consulting another physician. The medical report issued by said physician will also be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court based on its inherent merits.<sup>[29]</sup>

In the recent case of *Daniel M. Ison v. Crewserve, Inc., et al.*,<sup>[30]</sup> although ruling against the claimant therein, the Court upheld the above-cited view and evaluated the findings of the seafarer's doctors vis-à-vis the findings of the company-designated physician. A seafarer is, thus, not precluded from consulting a physician of his choice. Consequently, the findings of petitioner's own physician can be the basis in determining whether he is entitled to his disability claims.

Verily, the courts should be vigilant in their time-honored duty to protect labor, especially in cases of disability or ailment. When applied to Filipino seamen, the perilous nature of their work is considered in determining the proper benefits to be awarded. These benefits, at the very least, should approximate the risks they brave on board the vessel every single day.<sup>[31]</sup>

Accordingly, if serious doubt exists on the company-designated physician's declaration of the nature of a seaman's injury and its corresponding impediment grade, resort to prognosis of other competent medical professionals should be made. In doing so, a seaman should be given the opportunity to assert his claim after proving the nature of his injury. These pieces of evidence will in turn be used to determine the benefits rightfully accruing to him.<sup>[32]</sup>

It bears to note, at this juncture, that this Court is aware of its ruling in *Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.*<sup>[33]</sup>, wherein it sustained the findings of the company-designated physician vis-a-vis the contrary opinion of the doctors