

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 194533, April 19, 2017]

PHILIPPINE STEEL COATING CORP., PETITIONER, VS. EDUARD QUIÑONES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision^[1] and Resolution.^[2] The CA affirmed *in toto* the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision in Civil Case No. A-1708 for damages.^[3]

THE FACTS

This case arose from a Complaint for damages filed by respondent Quiñones (owner of Amianan Motors) against petitioner PhilSteel. The Complaint alleged that in early 1994, Richard Lopez, a sales engineer of PhilSteel, offered Quiñones their new product: primer-coated, long-span, rolled galvanized iron (G.I.) sheets. The latter showed interest, but asked Lopez if the primer-coated sheets were compatible with the Guilder acrylic paint process used by Amianan Motors in the finishing of its assembled buses. Uncertain, Lopez referred the query to his immediate superior, Ferdinand Angbengco, PhilSteel's sales manager.

Angbengco assured Quiñones that the quality of their new product was superior to that of the non-primer coated G.I. sheets being used by the latter in his business. Quiñones expressed reservations, as the new product might not be compatible with the paint process used by Amianan Motors.

Angbengco further guaranteed that a laboratory test had in fact been conducted by PhilSteel, and that the results proved that the two products were compatible; hence, Quiñones was induced to purchase the product and use it in the manufacture of bus units.

However, sometime in 1995, Quiñones received several complaints from customers who had bought bus units, claiming that the paint or finish used on the purchased vehicles was breaking and peeling off. Quiñones then sent a letter-complaint to PhilSteel invoking the warranties given by the latter. According to respondent, the damage to the vehicles was attributable to the hidden defects of the primer-coated sheets and/or their incompatibility with the Guilder acrylic paint process used by Amianan Motors, contrary to the prior evaluations and assurances of PhilSteel. Because of the barrage of complaints, Quiñones was forced to repair the damaged buses.

PhilSteel counters that Quiñones himself offered to purchase the subject product directly from the former without being induced by any of PhilSteel's representatives.

According to its own investigation, PhilSteel discovered that the breaking and peeling off of the paint was caused by the erroneous painting application done by Quiñones.

The RTC rendered a Decision^[4] in favor of Quiñones and ordered PhilSteel to pay damages. The trial court found that Lopez's testimony was damaging to PhilSteel's position that the latter had not induced Quiñones or given him assurance that his painting system was compatible with PhilSteel's primer-coated G.I. sheets. The trial court concluded that the paint blistering and peeling off were due to the incompatibility of the painting process with the primer-coated G.I. sheets. The RTC also found that the assurance made by Angbengco constituted an express warranty under Article 1546 of the Civil Code. Quiñones incurred damages from the repair of the buses and suffered business reverses. In view thereof, PhilSteel was held liable for damages.

THE RULING OF THE CA

TheCA affirmed the ruling of the RTC *in toto*.

The appellate court ruled that PhilSteel in fact made an express warranty that the primer-coated G.I. sheets were compatible with the acrylic paint process used by Quiñones on his bus units. The assurances made by Angbengco were confirmed by PhilSteel's own employee, Lopez.

The CA further held that the cause of the paint damage to the bus units of Quiñones was the incompatibility of the primer-coated sheet with the acrylic paint process used by Amianan Motors. The incompatibility was in fact acknowledged through a letter dated 29 June 1996 from Angbengco himself.^[5]

The CA also agreed with the RTC that PhilSteel was liable for both actual and moral damages. For actual damages, the appellate court reasoned that PhilSteel committed a breach of duty against Quiñones when the company made assurances and false representations that its primer-coated sheets were compatible with the acrylic paint process of Quiñones. The CA awarded moral damages, ruling that PhilSteel's almost two years of undue delay in addressing the repeated complaints about paint blisters constituted bad faith.

In addition, the CA concurred with the RTC that attorney's fees were in order since Quiñones was forced to file a case to recover damages.

Accordingly, the CA dismissed the appeal of PhilSteel.

Petitioner sought a reversal of the Decision in its Motion for Reconsideration. The motion was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution dated 19 November 2010.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether vague oral statements made by seller on the characteristics of a generic good can be considered warranties that may be invoked to warrant payment of damages;
2. Whether general warranties on the suitability of products sold prescribe in six (6) months under Article 1571 of the Civil Code;
3. Assuming that statements were made regarding the characteristics of the product, whether respondent as buyer is equally negligent; and
4. Whether non-payment of price is justified on allegations of breach of warranty.^[6]

OUR RULING

We **DENY** the Petition.

This Court agrees with the CA that this is a case of express warranty under Article 1546 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the thing is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the same, and if the buyer purchases the thing relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the thing, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only, shall be construed as a warranty, unless the seller made such affirmation or statement as an expert and it was relied upon by the buyer.

As held in *Carrascoso, Jr. v. CA*,^[7] the following requisites must be established in order to prove that there is an express warranty in a contract of sale: (1) the express warranty must be an affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the subject matter of the sale; (2) the natural effect of the affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the thing; and (3) the buyer purchases the thing relying on that affirmation or promise.

An express warranty can be oral when it is a positive affirmation of a fact that the buyer relied on.

Petitioner argues that the purported warranties by mere "vague oral statements" cannot be invoked to warrant the payment of damages.

A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods - contemporaneously and as part of the contract of sale that has reference to the character, quality or title of the goods; and is issued to promise or undertake to insure that certain facts are or shall be as the seller represents them.^[8] A warranty is not necessarily written. It may be oral as long as it is not given as a mere opinion or judgment. Rather, it is a positive affirmation of a fact that buyers rely upon, and that influences or induces them to purchase the product.^[9]

Contrary to the assertions of petitioner, the finding of the CA was that the former, through Angbengco, did not simply make vague oral statements on purported

warranties.^[10] Petitioner expressly represented to respondent that the primer-coated G.I. sheets were compatible with the acrylic paint process used by the latter on his bus units. This representation was made in the face of respondent's express concerns regarding incompatibility. Petitioner also claimed that the use of their product by Quiñones would cut costs. Angbengco was so certain of the compatibility that he suggested to respondent to assemble a bus using the primer-coated sheet and have it painted with the acrylic paint used in Amianan Motors.

At the outset, Quiñones had reservations about the compatibility of his acrylic paint primer with the primer-coated G.I. sheets of PhilSteel. But he later surrendered his doubts about the product after 4 to 5 meetings with Angbengco, together with the latter's subordinate Lopez. Only after several meetings was Quiñones persuaded to buy their G.I. sheets. On 15 April 1994, he placed an initial order for petitioner's product and, following Angbengco's instructions, had a bus painted with acrylic paint. The results of the painting test turned out to be successful. Satisfied with the initial success of that test, respondent made subsequent orders of the primer-coated product and used it in Amianan Motors' mass production of bus bodies.^[11]

Thus, it was not accurate for petitioner to state that they had made no warranties. It insisted that at best, they only gave "assurances" of possible savings Quiñones might have if he relied on PhilSteel's primer-coated G.I. sheets and eliminated the need to apply an additional primer.^[12]

All in all, these "vague oral statements" were express affirmations not only of the costs that could be saved if the buyer used PhilSteel's G.I. sheets, but also of the compatibility of those sheets with the acrylic painting process customarily used in Amianan Motors. Angbengco did not aimlessly utter those "vague oral statements" for nothing, but with a clear goal of persuading Quiñones to buy PhilSteel's product.

Taken together, the oral statements of Angbengco created an express warranty. They were positive affirmations of fact that the buyer relied on, and that induced him to buy petitioner's primer-coated G.I. sheets.

Under Article 1546 of the Civil Code, "[n]o affirmation of the value of the thing, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only, shall be construed as a warranty, unless the seller made such affirmation or statement as an expert and it was relied upon by the buyer."

Despite its claims to the contrary, petitioner was an expert in the eyes of the buyer Quiñones. The latter had asked if the primer-coated G.I. sheets were compatible with Amianan Motors' acrylic painting process. Petitioner's former employee, Lopez, testified that he had to refer Quiñones to the former's immediate supervisor, Angbengco, to answer that question. As the sales manager of PhilSteel, Angbengco made repeated assurances and affirmations and even invoked laboratory tests that showed compatibility.^[13] In the eyes of the buyer Quiñones, PhilSteel - through its representative, Angbengco - was an expert whose word could be relied upon.

This Court cannot subscribe to petitioner's stand that what they told Quiñones was mere dealer's talk or an exaggeration in trade that would exempt them from liability for breach of warranty. Petitioner cites *Gonzalo Puyat & Sons v. Arco Amusement Company*,^[14] in which this Court ruled that the contract is the law between the

parties and should include all the things they agreed to. Therefore, what does not appear on the face of the contract should be regarded merely as "dealer's" or "trader's talk," which cannot bind either party.^[15]

Contrary however to petitioner's position, the so-called dealer's or trader's talk cannot be treated as mere exaggeration in trade as defined in Article 1340 of the Civil Code.^[16] Quiñones did not talk to an ordinary sales clerk such as can be found in a department store or even a *sari-sari* store. If Lopez, a sales agent, had made the assertions of Angbengco without true knowledge about the compatibility or the authority to warrant it, then his would be considered dealer's talk. But sensing that a person of greater competence and knowledge of the product had to answer Quiñones' concerns, Lopez wisely deferred to his boss, Angbengco.

Angbengco undisputedly assured Quiñones that laboratory tests had been undertaken, and that those tests showed that the acrylic paint used by Quiñones was compatible with the primer-coated G.I. sheets of Philsteel. Thus, Angbengco was no longer giving a mere seller's opinion or making an exaggeration in trade. Rather, he was making it appear to Quiñones that PhilSteel had already subjected the latter's primed G.I. sheets to product testing. PhilSteel, through its representative, was in effect inducing in the mind of the buyer the belief that the former was an expert on the primed G.I. sheets in question; and that the statements made by petitioner's representatives, particularly Angbengco (its sales manager),^[17] could be relied on. Thus, petitioner did induce the buyer to purchase the former's G.I. sheets.

The prescription period of the express warranty applies to the instant case.

Neither the CA nor the RTC ruled on the prescription period applicable to this case. There being an express warranty, this Court holds that the prescription period applicable to the instant case is that prescribed for breach of an express warranty. The applicable prescription period is therefore that which is specified in the contract; in its absence, that period shall be based on the general rule on the rescission of contracts: four years (see Article 1389, Civil Code).^[18] In this case, no prescription period specified in the contract between the parties has been put forward. Quiñones filed the instant case on 6 September 1996^[19] or several months after the last delivery of the thing sold.^[20] His filing of the suit was well within the prescriptive period of four years; hence, his action has not prescribed.

The buyer cannot be held negligent in the instant case.

Negligence is the absence of reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in a given situation.^[21] Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code,^[22] where it is not stipulated in the law or the contract, the diligence required to comply with one's obligations is commonly referred to as *paterfamilias*; or, more specifically, as *bonos paterfamilias* or "a good father of a family." A good father of a family means a person of ordinary or average diligence. To determine the prudence and diligence that must be required of all persons, we must use as basis the abstract average standard corresponding to a normal orderly person. Anyone who uses diligence below this standard is guilty of negligence.^[23]