

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 250321, February 03, 2021]

**JOVIL CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT CORPORATION,
PETITIONER, VS. SPS. CLARISSA SANTOS MENDOZA AND
MICHAEL ERIC V. MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.**

[G.R. No. 250343]

**SPS. CLARISSA MENDOZA AND MICHAEL ERIC V. MENDOZA,
PETITIONERS, VS. JOVIL CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.**

D E C I S I O N

INTING, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on *Certiorari*^[1] filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision^[2] dated April 25, 2019 and the Resolution^[3] dated November 5, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 108141. The assailed Decision and Resolution affirmed the Decision^[4] dated September 2, 2016 of Branch 98, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City which dismissed the Complaint^[5] for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Jovil Construction and Equipment Corporation (JCEC) in Civil Case No. Q-06-58789.

The Antecedents

JCEC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against Spouses Clarissa Santos Mendoza and Michael Eric V. Mendoza (Spouses Mendoza) which sought the delivery of the clean certificates of title and peaceful possession of six contiguous parcels of land registered in the name of Spouses Mendoza, with an aggregate area of 33,289 square meters located in San Isidro, Montalban, Rizal (subject property). The subject property is the object of a Contract to Sell^[6] between JCEC and Spouses Mendoza for the amount of P11,318,260.00 to be paid in installments.

After two payments amounting to P5.6 Million, JCEC obtained possession of the subject property to begin the construction of a low-cost housing project as developer-proponent of Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC). When JCEC commenced the earthworks, the group of Benjamin Catalino (Catalino), who was claiming ownership over the subject property, prevented JCEC from proceeding. Subsequently, Spouses Mendoza filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against Catalino. The writ of preliminary injunction was granted by Branch 75, RTC, San Mateo, Rizal (RTC Rizal) in an Order^[7] dated October 2, 2000 in Civil Case No. 1388-98 SM.^[8]

Due to the disturbance of its possession, JCEC suspended its payment of the balance of the purchase price despite the RTC Rizal Order. It expressed its concern over the ownership dispute and requested for a renegotiation of the terms of the contract. Consequently, the two postdated checks previously issued by JCEC to Spouses Mendoza were dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." This prompted Spouses Mendoza to demand payment plus 3% interest per month from due date of the installment until full settlement. Despite the demand, JCEC was persistent in its request for a renegotiation and maintained that Catalino's group prevented its peaceful possession of the subject property.^[9] In response, Spouses Mendoza sent a Notice of Cancellation of Contract to Sell dated 7 July 1998 and Demand to Pay Accrued Interest^[10] (Notice of Cancellation of Contract) dated April 16, 2001. In addition, Spouses Mendoza demanded payment of accrued interests in the amount of P2,209,195.76.^[11]

Ruling of the RTC

In the Decision^[12] dated September 2, 2016, the RTC dismissed the complaint. For the RTC, the agreement between the parties was a contract to sell and the failure of JCEC to pay the balance of the purchase price resulted in its cancellation. It further noted that, while JCEC was initially justified in suspending its payment on account of the disturbance of its possession, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC Rizal against Catalino, coupled with JCEC's eventual reentry to the subject property, dispelled any interference on the latter's possession and gave rise to its concomitant obligation to settle payment immediately upon Spouses Mendoza's demand to pay. Thus, the RTC confirmed and ratified the cancellation of the Contract to Sell, subject to the return of 50% of the payments already made by JCEC to Spouses Mendoza pursuant to the stipulation in the contract that cancellation or termination would result in the forfeiture of 50% of all payments made.

As to the counterclaim of Spouses Mendoza, the RTC concluded that JCEC was liable only for the interest from March 2001 to April 2001. It explained that JCEC's breach of the contract should be counted from March 2001, when Spouses Mendoza demanded payment, until April 2001, when the Notice of Cancellation of Contract was issued. According to the RTC, the suspension of payment before the demand to pay was justified. Thus, the RTC computed that JCEC is liable for P71,547.80 representing 3% interest on the unpaid balance of P5,718,260.00 which shall be deducted from the P2,800,000.00 pursuant to the forfeiture clause in the contract. The RTC denied the award of attorney's fees for lack of basis.

Both parties elevated the case to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the Decision^[13] dated April 25, 2019, the CA denied both appeals and affirmed the findings of the RTC. It ruled that Spouses Mendoza had no obligation to transfer title before full payment of the purchase price.^[14] Further, it held that JCEC had no right to suspend payments after the RTC Rizal issued a writ of preliminary injunction because JCEC inspected the property before entering into the contract and the disturbance was a mere act of trespass.^[15] It also found Spouses Mendoza to have complied with the provisions of the contract as they immediately filed and obtained

an injunction order to clear the subject property from illegal occupants.

The CA agreed with the RTC that JCEC cannot be penalized with punitive interest for the period when it was prevented from possessing the subject property as the intervening fact was not attributable to JCEC's fault.^[16] It explained that the option to put the subject property in escrow was upon JCEC as vendee; and because no demand was forthcoming from the latter, Spouses Mendoza were not obligated to place the titles in escrow. It also agreed with the RTC in ruling that Spouses Mendoza should return 50% of the total payments already made by JCEC pursuant to the forfeiture clause; and that because the contract was deemed cancelled, the penalty interest computed from due date until satisfaction had no basis as there was no longer any balance of payment to speak of after the cancellation of the contract.^[17]

Both parties moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motions.^[18] Hence, the consolidated petitions for review on *certiorari* filed by JCEC and Spouses Mendoza.

The Issues

Aggrieved by the CA Decision, both parties elevated the case to the Court *via* their respective petitions for review on *certiorari*. The main issues in this case are: (a) whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC's confirmation of the cancellation or termination of the Contract to Sell; and (b) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's ruling that JCEC was not liable for punitive interest counted from the demand made by Spouses Mendoza until its full payment.

JCEC reiterates the breach of contract committed by Spouses Mendoza for their failure to clear the subject property from other claimants. It also justifies its suspension of payment of the balance of the purchase price because of the disturbance of its possession and the absence of any declaration of ownership by the RTC Rizal in the injunction order. Under the circumstances, JCEC argues that Spouses Mendoza were in bad faith and that mutual restitution should be ordered, if cancellation was indeed proper.

Meanwhile, Spouses Mendoza argue that JCEC should be liable for punitive interest in accordance with the contract. They reiterate that JCEC failed to timely pay the balance of the purchase price and its suspension of payment was not valid.

Our Ruling

The petitions must fail.

The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of the CA. As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to a review of pure questions of law because the Court is not a trier of facts.^[19] Factual findings of the lower court when supported by substantial evidence on record is not usually reviewed by the Supreme Court, especially when it is affirmed by the CA.^[20] In this case, there is no cogent evidence that impels the Court to apply the above doctrine differently. Thus, there is no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings which are firmly anchored on sufficient and competent evidence.